OPERATION MARKET GARDEN: CASE STUDY FOR ANALYZING SENIOR LEADER RESPONSIBILITES
The higher up the chain of command, the greater is the need for boldness to be supported by a reflective mind, so that boldness does not degenerate into purposeless bursts of blind passion. Command becomes progressively less a matter of personal sacrifice and increasingly concerned for the safety of others and for the common purpose.
-Carl von Clausewitz, On War
Operation MARKET GARDEN was a strategic plan proposed by British Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery and approved by Supreme Allied Commander General (GEN) Dwight D. Eisenhower. Considered a gamble, especially coming from the cautious Montgomery, its level of risk and probability of success were questioned by leaders and staffs of all effected echelons before it was conducted. And in the end, it was an overall failure. Between 17 and 26 September 1944, there were over 11,000
casualties among three participating Allied airborne divisions. This casualty count represented just under one third of the committed airborne force; it was more than among all Allies on 6 June 1944, the first day of Operation OVERLORD. 1 There were over 17,000 Allied casualties, when the ground force numbers are included. More than one Allied division was lost in the 10 days of Operation MARKET GARDEN. This paper will examine responsibilities in senior leader decision making, using
Operation MARKET GARDEN as the case study. While understanding hindsight is 20/20, it will consider what senior leaders said and did about the operation before it launched to determine if those responsible did what they were charged to do. It will also consider whether the plan was sound, or if it should have been conducted at all. Both Montgomery and Bradley were clamoring for supplies, most significantly gasoline, needed to continue their operations. Allied forces were still reliant on supplies being trucked predominately from the Cherbourg port in France, more than 400 miles from the 12 th Army Group. Allied bombing campaigns prior to OVERLORD destroyed 3 the railway system in Western Europe which could have eased the strain. The US "Red
Ball Express" trucked supplies to the front, but this was laborious. It took ten trucks to get five truckloads forward; vehicles wore out quickly. As for flying in supplies, the lack of aircraft, lift restrictions, and airfield availability limited this option. Attempts at opening new ports had yet to come to fruition. Although 21 st Army Group forces captured the major Belgian port city of Antwerp on 4 September 1944, they did not pursue the fight further so German forces still controlled the Scheldt Estuary and the fifty-mile water approaches to the port, making it unusable. Eisenhower had to determine how to prioritize the limited supplies which could be brought to the front. A major river that cuts across the line of attack is a great inconvenience to the attacker. . . .Worse, if he intends to offer a decisive battle on the far side, or if he expects the enemy to attack him, he will expose himself to grave danger. So no general will place himself in such a position unless he can count on substantial moral and material superiority. It was the first daylight airborne operation. Allied leaders were unsure how successful it could be, due to concerns over enemy defenses, most specifically flak.
Intelligence reports estimated a high probability of flak throughout the area of operations, but especially from an area just north of Arnhem. Drop zones were selected with extreme caution favoring inbound aircraft. This hindered the placement of the 1 st ABN DIV; it had to use drop zones over eight miles from its primary objective -the bridge over the Lower Rhine River in Arnhem. It was the most successful airborne and glider action of the war. The loss rate of aircraft and crews was two and one half percent, far less than Normandy. Almost all paratroopers landed on or within a mile of their designated drop zones, far higher than Normandy.
14 But the enemy situation the Allied forces found was different than they expected.
After weeks of rapid advance, the Allies faced significant resistance. During the week In my-prejudiced-view, if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job-it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2 nd S.S. Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. 16 He outlined four key reasons for the failure of the operation. While he was the architect of the plan, he had concurrence from Eisenhower and received feedback from 
Montgomery's First After Action Point.
The operation was not regarded at Supreme Headquarters as the spearhead of a major Allied movement on the northern flank designed to isolate, and finally to occupy, the Ruhr-the one objective in the West which the Germans could not afford to lose. There is no doubt in my mind that Eisenhower always wanted to give priority to the northern thrust and to scale down the southern one. He ordered this to be done, and he thought it was being done. It was not being done. . . . Analysis. Upon reflection, it is easy to disagree with Montgomery's perspective.
He did not want simply a priority on maintenance and supply for MARKET GARDEN; he wanted it all, with the rest of the Allied force be put on hold. This was an unrealistic expectation. His perspective seemed to be biased for two different reasons. First,
MARKET GARDEN was his big chance to prove Eisenhower wrong -his "single thrust" plan should replace "broad front" as the overarching strategy for SHAEF. Second, Montgomery could not get past fighting with US leaders Bradley and Patton. He perceived they received unfair quantities of supplies during this period when he was the priority, which was not the case in reality. As Bradley explained, "Montgomery accused me of having hedged on Ike's orders. . . .The charge was easily refuted, for it was
Eisenhower himself who apportioned the tonnage allotments between them. We followed those requirements to the letter. . . ." 20 
Montgomery's Second After Action Point.
The airborne forces at Arnhem were dropped too far away from the vital objective-the bridge. It was some hours before they reached it. I take the blame for this mistake. I should have ordered Second Army and 1 Airborne Corps to arrange that at least one complete Parachute Brigade was dropped quite close to the bridge, so that it could have been captured in a matter of minutes and its defence soundly organized with time to spare. I did not do so. actions contributed to the overall failure, "I oppose, however, any suggestion that the airborne operation in Holland was a failure. It was an outstanding success. We accomplished every mission assigned to us in the original plan." 28 While his airborne divisions fought as hard and held out as long as they were capable of doing, their degraded strength was due to his decisions on lift support.
Montgomery's Third After Action Point.
The weather. This turned against us after the first day and we could not carry out much of the later airborne programme. But weather is always an uncertain factor, in war and in peace. This uncertainty we all accepted. It could only have been offset, and the operation made a certainty, by allotting additional resources to the project, so that it became an Allied and not merely a British project. 29 Actions and Comments by Other Senior Leaders. While no senior leader wrote about weather as an objection prior to the battle, it should have been considered by all.
As early as June 1944, SHAEF reports began warning that operations in Western
Europe would be hindered by bad weather by the end of the summer, "By September 20, at the latest, we can count upon the beginning of winter weather. After that date air operations will be spasmodic. . . .we should strive in every possible way to make maximum use of our air during the next 60 to 90 days." 30 Since bad weather caused the cancellation of other airborne operations, including Operation COMET just the week before, the potential impact of weather was not a novel idea.
Analysis. While there was nothing any senior leader could have done to affect the weather, they could have done things differently to mitigate the impact of bad weather. A plan this complex which relied on nearly perfect weather in England and the Netherlands for one week when considering the known weather patterns was unrealistic. Brereton believed weather had significant impact on the operation's outcome in three ways, "First, it hindered resupply, and secondly, it delayed the arrival of reinforcements. The comparative lack of air support. . .was due partly to weather." 31 It 20 could have been mitigated by some of the same ways described in Montgomery's second after action point -through the change in the placement of the 1 st ABN DIV's drop zones to be closer to the bridge, as well as the double mission on 17 September. If both of these changes had occurred, there would be less need for additional forces to arrive quickly, so then if weather stopped reinforcements from arriving, as did happen, it would not have had such a significant impact.
Montgomery's Fourth After Action Point.
The 2 nd S.S. Panzer Corps was refitting in the Arnhem area, having limped up there after its mauling in Normandy. We knew it was there. But we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively; its battle state was far beyond our expectation. It was quickly brought into action against the 1 st Airborne Division. Corps (UK) staff, was also skeptical: "I was also worried about General Browning and my brother officers. There seemed to be a general assumption that the war was virtually over and that one last dashing stroke would finish it. The possibility of German opposition was scarcely worthy of discussion." 34 MG Urquhart observed similar attitudes, especially among ground forces who had helped with the rapid advance:
"They were 'victory happy.'" 35 Of course they were! The Guards Armoured Division alone moved 250 miles in the six days leading up to the capture of Brussels just a few days earlier. 36 A SHAEF planning policy memorandum on the establishment of airheads included guidance, "Because of the inherent weakness of airborne or air landed troops versus armour, it is desirable that the airhead be located a maximum distance from any known panzer division." 37 Additional After Action Considerations. In addition to Montgomery's four key points, based on other senior leader and unit after action reports, three other points should be explored: terrain, combat leadership, and "political" pressure.
Terrain. The plan relied on the armored, ground force to travel on a single, elevated road above marshy fields or in urban terrain for more than sixty miles in enemy-held territory while crossing multiple water obstacles.
Actions and Comments by Other Senior Leaders. Horrocks and Adair, as the senior ground leaders, were both concerned about the terrain. For Horrocks, it was his 24 first and most important concern: "The country was wooded and rather marshy which made any outflanking operation impossible. The only thing I could do was to blast my way down the main road on a comparatively narrow front." 47 By the afternoon of 19
September, D+2, only 48 hours after the battle began, Horrocks already knew the terrain and route were the cause of his formation's delay. He told Gavin, "Jim, never try to fight an entire Corps off one road." 48 Adair wrote, "It was novel in the extreme. It was clear that the advance throughout had to be virtually on a one-tank front. . . .I too had underestimated the problems of advancing on such a narrow front and across such difficult ground." 49 His
Operations Officer, Freddie Hennessy, explained the complexity of the plan "like threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we have only to miss one to be in trouble." 50 The 101st's commander, Taylor, also thought terrain was the key to the operation's failure:
The critical fault had been in the concept of an army on a front measured by the width of one road. Even if the British ground commanders had driven northward with the ardor of a Patton, that single road would have presented most serious logistical difficulties to sustained operations. As it turned out, it was the slowness of the ground advance and the bad luck of the British Airborne Division in landing among unreported German armored units that were the immediate causes of the failure of Arnhem. 51 Analysis. This terrain information was known to Allied forces, through firsthand experience, intelligence estimates, and Dutch underground reports, as well as Dutch military advisors assigned to most Allied commands. As with the weather discussion, there was nothing senior leaders could have done to affect the terrain. But they could have done things differently to mitigate the potential impact of it. If one vehicle was hit, it took significant effort to push it off the road before the attack could resume, since there 25 was no room to maneuver around it. For a plan this complex to rely on one road was unrealistic, especially with the stated timelines on which the airborne forces were reliant.
Terrain issues could have been mitigated by expanding the 30 th Corps' avenue of approach to include a second roadway, if not immediately after crossing the BelgianDutch border, at least vicinity Eindhoven. The 30 th Corps moved with one division on point, leading one long convoy. It could have split its force so the leading divisions maneuvered abreast. Even these changes would have had minimal impact overall, as the roads were still elevated with marshy low fields alongside. There was no maneuver room, negating any benefit an armored force might bring to bear.
After the speed of advance in the weeks leading up to MARKET GARDEN, however, ground force leaders lost sight of terrain being a concern. At the end of August and beginning of September, the lead ground unit -the Guards Armoured Division - [W]e came up with the advance elements of British armor. There a junior officer stopped me and told me I could go no further because the road in front was swept with small arms fire. So we stopped a minute to watch how good our British comrades would take out this resistance. They had the muzzles of their tank guns pointing down the road toward where the enemy was supposed to be, but not a shot was being fired. It was a demonstration of caution. . . .I had seen it, and dealt with it many times before. . . .I couldn't order this tank commander to move on down the road. So, after waiting about forty minutes, and seeing no visible effort being made to outflank this resistance. . .we (Author's note: "we" means Ridgway and his aides) started walking down the ditch along the side of the road. We went a mile and a half, perhaps, with every sense alert, but not a shot was fired at us. . . .We moved on until we found General Max Taylor at the CP of the 101 st Division. Tucker was livid. I had never seen him so angry. He had expected that when he seized his end of the bridge, the British armor would race on to Arnhem and link up with Urquhart. His first question to me was, "What in the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over twelve hours, and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea. Why in hell don't they get to Arnhem?" I did not have an answer for him. 57 Urquhart, whose division took the brunt of the casualties, was frustrated with his own countrymen, "I could not help wondering why 30th Corps had been so slow and unaware of the urgency when they had a commander with such a capacity for dynamic human relations." 58 Horrocks believed he had done all he could to emphasize the need for maximum speed. In his operations briefing, he said, "Speed absolutely vital, as we must reach the It soon became obvious that the vast, highly-trained airborne army in the U.K. was bursting to go. Plan after plan was devised for their use, only to be discarded at the last moment as their objective had invariably been captured by our ground forces before they could get there. I almost began to apologize for the speed of our advance. 65 Adair had a similar view: "During our advance from Normandy we had constantly been told that the airborne forces were about to be launched in one operation or another. September, and the powers that be were not risking another cancellation at the last moment." 71 Montgomery also had to prove his "single thrust" plan was better suited to bring World War II to a quick close than was Eisenhower's "broad front" strategy.
Having been given Eisenhower's strategic reserve, he did not want to lose it to someone else's plan; it was the biggest advantage he might get. The many other airborne operations planned and not conducted in the summer of 1944 demonstrated he had to use them and quickly. Eisenhower's response: "What this action proved was that the idea of 'one full blooded thrust' to Berlin was silly." 72 Eisenhower sacrificed an Allied division to allow Montgomery to prove it.
Operation MARKET GARDEN is one of the most studied and written about operations of World War II. It will continue to be so for several reasons: it was a valiant effort by a large airborne force behind enemy lines; it was an overall failure; in this one small part of the overall battleground between Allied and German forces and in one short period of time, there were more casualties from the airborne force alone than among all of the Allies on "D-Day"; and some of the most renowned leaders of twentieth 
